I believe that there is no monster of Loch Ness -- although I concede that I could be wrong. If you were honest, you would also concede that you could be wrong....But you claim that the flowers and trees are "revelations." The existence of nature does not establish a god, let alone yours specifically. I am also aware that you claim your holy book. But other religions claim theirs. (emphasis added)
Dr. Bahnsen rhetorical comeback hits the mark. Suppose a basketball player, say Michael Jordan, beats every worthy opponent in one-on-one basketball games. He can justifiably claim to be the best individual basketball player in the world. Suppose further that another jealous (and peevish) basketball player who was previously trounced by Jordan resents that he (Jordan) has titled himself "the best player in the world." His comeback is, "just because you have beat every current player does not mean that there is not another one coming who is better than you." Jordan's response can be anticipated; "bring on my next opponent." The theoretical possibility that there may be another player better than Jordan is not a concern to him. In the world of basketball, it is the one who is actually the best player, and not who is possibly be the best player, that is of importance. In the practice of apologetics, things are similar. What matters are actual worldviews not possible worldviews.
Second, while this criticism is of no practical value to the non-Christian, it would be, nevertheless a serious criticism of TAG if correct. The reason is easy to see. If there are an infinite number of worldviews and TAG only refutes a small slice of them, if one may speak this way, then it has not established that Christianity is the necessary precondition of human intelligibility. That is, even granting that TAG demonstrates the absurdity of all actual worldviews, it does not follow that all possible worldviews are likewise absurd.
Bahnsen's comeback is to place the one who makes this move on the horns of a dilemma (actually a "trilemma"). The "unbeliever either (1) implicitly assumes the Christian's presuppositions, (2) considers it a mystery that not everything is mysterious or nonsensical, or (3) offers a worldview in which words and reasoning are meaningful." On (1) the imaginary opponent loses the debate. On (3) the Christian proceeds to refute the proffered worldview. As for (2), Bahnsen contends that this is tantamount to acknowledging defeat. He then considers the possibility of one making a blind leap of faith; one who "hold[s] out the hope that someday, somewhere, someone will furnish an adequate autonomous worldview to protect unbelievers against the compelling rationality of Christianity." This, he says, is identical with (2) and since this is acknowledgment of defeat, the opponent loses the debate.