Putting these two arguments together as one syllogism, makes the argument for God and knowledge. Also included in the paper was some juicy nuggets of logic that will be interesting to watch Atheists attempt to counter. The paper goes in to lengthy detail behind the entire argument. So, if you want any explanation of a point in question, please refer to the paper written. I am merely pointing to the argument, in its entirety, so we can present it to the Atheists.
Maybe an Atheist can come up with a systematic argumentation of their beliefs for the purpose of accountability of their reasoning. I have yet come across such a paper, if it even exists. It would be quite helpful to flesh out the truth if it were presented to us. Takers?
IF KNOWLEDGE THEN GOD:
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS OF PLANTINGA AND VAN TIL
by James Anderson
It sets up and addresses many of the same arguments that we are having here. Things like Atheists claim if we are to have knowledge, then we must be omniscient. Look what Van Til says about that.
"The only way then for man to have any knowledge of either temporal or eternal things is for a God to think for us in eternal categories and reveal to us the Measure of truth we can fathom. Thus we hold that Christian theism is the only alternative to skepticism.
We must not argue as though we can already know a great deal about nature by itself but that, inasmuch as we cannot know all that ought to be known about it, there must be one who knows infinitely more than we do. We must rather reason that unless God exists as ultimate, as self-subsistent, we could not even know anything; we could not even reason that God must exist, nor could we even ask a question about God.
The Calvinist, therefore, using his point of contact, observes to the non-Christian that if the world were not what Scripture says it is, if the natural man’s knowledge were not actually rooted in the creation and providence of God, then there could be no knowledge whatsoever." ~(Refs in Anderson's paper)
One of the most interesting points, that we even have been struggling with here, is “Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.” (EEAN) "The basic idea behind EAAN is simple enough to grasp: if one believes that humans are the product of undirected naturalistic evolutionary processes, one thereby has good reason to doubt the deliverances of one’s own mind — including, of course, the belief that humans are the product of undirected naturalistic evolutionary processes. This belief is thus irrational, since it is self-defeating."
"EAAN is an argument not for the falsity of naturalism, but for the irrationality of naturalism (regardless of whether it is true or not). Second, the argument does not purport to show that naturalism as such is irrational; rather, it is a certain kind of epistemologically self-conscious naturalism that finds itself mired in the quicksand of skepticism. Third, Plantinga takes EAAN to function indirectly as an argument for theism, given that theism is the only credible alternative to naturalism."
Plantinga writes "If I reject theism in favor of ordinary naturalism, and also see that [the probability that my cognitive faculties are reliable given that naturalism is true] is low or inscrutable, then I will have a defeater for any belief I hold. If so, I will not, if forming beliefs rationally, hold any belief firmly enough to constitute knowledge. The same goes if I am merely agnostic as between theism and ordinary naturalism."
The systematic argument:
Where R is the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliable (i.e., that they furnish us with mostly true beliefs), N is the proposition that metaphysical naturalism is the case, and E the proposition that human beings arose by way of commonly accepted evolutionary processes:
(1) P(R/N&E) is either low or inscrutable.
for any person S:
(2) If S believes both N&E and (1), then S has a defeater for R.
(3) If S has a defeater for R, then S has a defeater for all S’s beliefs, including
the belief that N&E.
(4) For any (human) person S to have knowledge, S must have beliefs produced
by cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a good design plan
aimed at true-belief production.
(5) If metaphysical naturalism is the case, then no (human) person has cognitive
faculties that (in any literal sense) function properly according to a good
design plan aimed at true-belief production.
(6) Therefore, if metaphysical naturalism is the case, then no (human) person
(7) But some (human) persons do have knowledge; therefore, metaphysical
naturalism is not the case.
(8) Therefore, given the implausibility of other alternatives, theism is the case.
Where MR stands for metaphysical realism, T for theism, and GS for global skepticism:
(9) If MR and ~T, then GS [Plantinga’s adaptation of Putnam’s thesis].
(10) MR [since its denial is counter intuitive and reduces to absurdity].
(11) ~GS [since we know things about the world].
(12) Therefore, either ~MR or T [from (9) and (11)].
(13) Therefore, T [from (10) and (12)].
(14) The ontology of the universe is such that either (a) unity is ultimate and not
plurality, or (b) plurality is ultimate and not unity, or (c) unity and plurality
(15) If unity is ultimate and not plurality, then knowledge of the universe (even
in part) is impossible.
(16) If plurality is ultimate and not unity, then knowledge of the universe (even
in part) is impossible.
(17) Knowledge of the universe is not impossible.
(18) Therefore, the ontology of the universe must be such that unity and plurality
(19) Therefore, Christian theism is the case (since only Christian theism posits an
ontology in which unity and plurality are co-ultimate).
(20) If no one has comprehensive knowledge of the universe, then no one can
have any knowledge of the universe.
(21) Only God could have comprehensive knowledge of the universe.
(22) We have some knowledge of the universe.
(23) Therefore, God exists.
(24) If theism is not the case, then one cannot account for the uniformity of
nature presupposed by inductive reasoning.
(25) If one cannot account for the uniformity of nature presupposed by inductive
reasoning, then beliefs based on inductive reasoning are not warranted.
(26) Beliefs based on inductive reasoning are warranted.
(27) Therefore, theism is the case.
(28) Human knowledge and communication are possible only if (i) the world
exhibits a coherent, relational structure and (ii) human minds possess a
common conceptual scheme which properly reflects that structure (and thus
allows for correspondence between the way the world is and the way we
think it is).
(29) If theism is not the case, then there are no grounds for believing (i) and (ii).
(30) Therefore, if theism is not the case, then there are no grounds for believing
that human knowledge and communication are possible.
(31) There are grounds for believing that human knowledge and communication
(32) Therefore, theism is the case.
When you see the argument we are hard pressed to believe that evolutionary naturalism is all we have. There is guidance to our path of knowledge, and as Anderson pointed to in his Paper:
If only the Atheists would acknowledge these points, and the fact there is a path.